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1 The very first time I gave a lecture abroad this was in Trieste back in 1998, invited by
Ezio Pellizer, about the function and place of insulting language in ancient society. The
title was “Insulti, contesto ed occasione, oppure che cosa fa di un insulto un insulto?”.
Since  the  study  of  aiskhrologia,  insults  and parolacce has  always  interested  Ezio,  in
various ways, starting from his “Morfologia della poesia giambica arcaica” in 1981, for
this occasion I would like to follow up on this subject, to which I have kept coming back
from time to time along the years, both in relation to comedy and, more recently, to
the reception of invective and the genres of invective in ancient society. One of the
conclusions of my research has been that the reception of this kind of language saw a
marked evolution in Greek history, and that there was in archaic and classical Greece a
clear differentiation, a real dividing line between the use of the language of invective in
poetry  and  in  daily  life.  Now  I propose  to  discuss  another  aspect  of  this  problem,
namely the difference between παρρησία and the insulting language of comedy.1
 
2. Ancient and modern views of comic license
2 The expression comic  parrhesia is  very  common in  the  scholarly  literature,  and the
notion  that  the  word  παρρησία  in  ancient  Greek  may  denote  comedy’s  freedom of
speech  is  almost  commonplace,  both  in  scholarship  about  freedom  of  speech  or
frankness and about comedy or generally about invective.2 However, the word parrhesia
hardly occurs in the classical era in relation to comedy or even poetry. In all the extant
Greek  literature  of  the  classical  period,  only  one  passage  connects  parrhesia with
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comedy, Isocrates, De pace 14. In order to describe what to him is the unbearable state
of the Athenian democracy, Isocrates says that there is no parrhesia, “except here in the
Assembly for those who are foolish and do not care about you, or in the theater for the
comic poets”. We will  comment on it later,  but the simple fact that this is the only
occurrence of such a connection should make it suspect and justifies a re‑examination
of the evidence.
3 All the studies that somehow deal with comic parrhesia in fact rely either on late texts
or on the connection of both comedy and parrhesia with insult or slander. And in the
latter  case  it  is  the  modern  studies  rather  than  their  sources  which  make  the
connection between comedy and parrhesia through the use of insulting language. Take
for instance the introduction to the very interesting book on free speech in antiquity
by Sluiter and Rosen:3 “Since frankness may also involve a certain lack of consideration
for societal niceties, it also becomes associated with an uncouth manner—this is how
we find it as a form of comic ponêria. ‘Calling a spade a spade’ is part of the concept of 
parrhêsia.”
4 “Calling  a  spade  a  spade”  is  indeed  part  of  the  concept  of parrhesia.  However,  the
authors’ two sources to connect parrhesia with comedy do not allow such a connection.
One  of  them  ([Demetr.]  De elocutione 229)  connects  it  with  “the  outspokenness  of
friendship” rather than comedy. The other (Lucian’s Quomodo hist. conscr. 41), apart
from the fact that it is very late, only says that a comic poet uses the proverb “calling a
fig a fig and a trough a trough”. The proverb conveys the notion of parrhesia,  but if
Lucian intends a connection between parrhesia and the genre of comedy at all, this is
done in a very indirect and flimsy way. Moreover, even though ‘calling a spade a spade’
is part of the concept of parrhêsia, it is not necessarily part of comedy. In comedy, it is
perfectly at home to call a spade a cloud, a prostitute, a politician, or a bird (whatever
indeed). This is so because the idiom “calling a spade a spade” means speaking bluntly,
but also frankly; it conveys the notion that one says what one believes to be the truth.
This  is  the  meaning  of parrhesia,  as  several  studies  have  made  clear,  starting
particularly from Foucault (1983). Instead, there is nothing in the ancient references to
comedy, at least in the classical period, to support the notion that comedy tells the
truth or what the author believes to be the truth.
5 The confusion of comic license with parrhesia betrays what, in my view, is a confusion
about the Greek views on the genre in the classical period: contrary to common modern
practice, there is no indication that Athenians of the classical period saw comic speech
as an expression of parrhesia, and interpreting comedy in this way does real damage to
the interpretation of  the function and import  of  comedy in classical  Athens.  While
comedy refers very often to itself and to its own capacity to speak freely, to openly say
whatever the comic poet or the characters deem appropriate against or for whatever
or whomever, it never uses the word παρρησία  in this context. This fact suggests by
itself that parrhesia is not the right word to denote the comic language.4 It is true that,
as usual, we have a small percentage of the old comic production, but we do have many
references to its capacity to speak freely, and the fact that such a capacity is never
expressed by this word is telling in itself. There is only one occurrence of the word in
Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae 541, where it denotes the political freedom of speech
which is the preserve of the citizens. This is the most common meaning we find in
contemporary texts—subverted in this case because they are women citizens rather
than men, whereas women did not have the right of free speech in real Athens:
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ΜΝΗ.                                     Εἰ γὰρ οὔσης
παρρησίας κἀξὸν λέγειν ὅσαι πάρεσμεν ἀσταί…
Don’t we have the right to speak freely, we citizen women who are present
at this gathering?
6 There is more. Not only comedy never uses the word parrhesia to refer to its freedom of
speech, but indeed, as we saw at the beginning, in all the extant Greek literature of the
classical period, only one single passage connects παρρησία with comedy. And there are
other  indications  that  the  free  speech  of  comedy  was  not  equated  to parrhesia in
classical Greece. All of them are e silentio,  but in this case they are quite significant,
since there could hardly have been a text disavowing the connection explicitly. To me
the most telling case is Plato’s. Since Plato is quite hostile to both parrhesia and drama,
he would hardly have missed the opportunity to connect them, had there been the
slenderest grounds to do so, i.e. had they been somehow connected in Greek thought.
He never did so, which is a non‑minor sign that indeed such a link did not exist. And
another significant case is the Old Oligarch. Even though he does not employ the word 
parrhesia, he is very interested in the notion of free speaking, both in the Assembly and
in the relation between social groups (slaves vs freemen, foreign residents vs citizens),
and  is  the  only  text  in  the  classical  period  (apart  from  comedy  itself)  to  mention
comedy in connection with the sociopolitical strife. Free speaking is in this text ἐᾶν
λέγειν ἑξῆς (1.6, paralleled with βουλεύειν) and ἰσηγορία (1.12); what the comic poets
do is termed κωμῳδεῖν and κακῶς λέγειν (2.18). Again, even though he is very hostile
to both uses of speech, he never confuses them. According to him, both have some
significance on the political scene, but nothing allows us to suggest that he conceives of
them as something similar or that what the comic poets say has to do with ἰσηγορία or
with free speech among equals.
 
3. Uses of the word ‘parrhesia’ in Isocrates and
elsewhere
7 Since in Isocrates we find the only connection of parrhesia with comedy, we will study
the uses of the word in this author, in comparison to other fifth- and fourth-century
texts, in order to evaluate the import of such a connection in its context. The treatment
of parrhesia in  Isocrates  is  precise  and finely  nuanced.  There  are  17 occurrences  of
either the noun or the verb in his oeuvre, and its meaning and appreciation shifts more
or less in every context. In principle, speaking with parrhesia means saying something
openly, often including the nuance ‘frankly’, either in public or in private. We find this
uncontroversial use in several cases:
8 In Ad Demonicum 34,  this is  contrasted with saying something to a friend in a more
concealed way:
περὶ  ὧν  ἂν  αἰσχύνῃ  παρρησιάσασθαι,  βούλῃ  δέ  τισι τῶν  φίλων  ἀνακοινώσασθαι,
χρῶ  τοῖς  λόγοις  ὡς  περὶ  ἀλλοτρίου  τοῦ  πράγματος·  οὕτω  γὰρ  τὴν  ἐκείνων  τε
γνῶσιν αἰσθήσει, καὶ σεαυτὸν οὐ καταφανῆ ποιήσεις.
When there  is  anything of  which you are  ashamed to speak  openly,  but
about which you wish to confer with some of your friends, speak as though it
were another’s affair; thus you will get at their opinion, and will not betray
your own case. [Transl. Norlin]
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9 In Busiris 1 it means speaking frankly and openly, but in private:
τὴν  μὲν  ἐπιείκειαν  τὴν  σήν,  ὦ  Πολύκρατες,  καὶ  τὴν  τοῦ  βίου  μεταβολὴν  παρ᾽
ἄλλων πυνθανόμενος οἶδα·  τῶν δὲ λόγων τινὰς ὧν γέγραφας, αὐτὸς ἀνεγνωκὼς
ἥδιστα μὲν ἄν σοι περὶ ὅλης ἐπαρρησιασάμην τῆς παιδεύσεως περὶ ἣν ἠνάγκασαι
διατρίβειν.
I have learned of your fairmindedness, Polycrates, and of the reversal in your
life, through information from others; and having myself read certain of the
discourses  which  you  have  written,  I should  have  been  greatly  pleased
to discuss frankly with you and fully the education with which you have
been obliged to occupy yourself. [Transl. Van Hook]
10 In principle, parrhesia is a democratic right.5 The first occurrences of the word illustrate
this meaning. In Euripides’ Ion 670–75, Hippolytus 420–23, and Phoenician Women 387–91,
it is the right which defines citizenship, as opposed to foreignness or to slavery.6 The
very first occurrence of the word may be Democritus 226 D‑K (if  it is  not spurious).
Being a sentence without context,  it  is  difficult to determine whether it  refers to a
political  or  to  a  private  usage,  but  one  keyword,  ἐλευθερίη  (‘freedom’),  makes  it
perfectly adequate for a political democratic reading: “parrhesia is intrinsic to freedom;
the risk lies in discerning the right moment” (οἰκήιον ἐλευθερίης παρρησίην, κίνδυνος
δὲ ἡ τοῦ καιροῦ διάγνωσις).7
11 However, parrhesia is conceived of as a possibility also in non-democratic situations. 8
There it is not a right or anything that goes with citizenship—indeed non‑democratic
states  are  conceived  as having  no  rights—,  but  something  that  the  sovereign  can
graciously  concede or  not.  Euripides,  Bacchae 668–71 is  an example of  this  use:  the
Messenger asks king Pentheus whether he may speak with parrhesia, for otherwise he
fears the king’s ‘too kingly’ temper. Also in Euripides, Electra 1049–50 and 1055–56 it is
the queen Clytemnestra who grants parrhesia to Electra;  in this case she is also her
mother, and Electra addresses her as ‘mother’, but nothing tells us that the notion of 
parrhesia was applicable in the relationship between parents and children.
ΚΛΥΤ. λέγ’εἴ τι χρήιζεις κἀντίθες παρρησίαι,
ὁπως τέθνηκε σὸς πατὴρ ἐνδίκως.
Speak if you have need or reason. Refute me freely;
demonstrate how your father died without full justice.
[…]
ΗΛ. μέμνησο, μῆτερ, οὓς ἔλεξας ὑστάτους
λόγους, διδοῦσα πρὸς σέ μοι παρρησίαν.
Keep in mind, Mother, those last words you spoke,
giving me license to speak out freely against you. (Transl. Vermeule)
12 Also in the Athenaion Politeia 16.6 tolerance of parrhesia on the part of Peisistratus is a
sign of the mildness of his tyranny. In Isocrates, this usage is found in To Nicocles (§ 3
and § 28). In this speech we are in a sort of middle ground between the political and the
private usage. On the one hand, parrhesia is apparently applied here to private relations
of friendship:
[2.3] εἰ δυνηθείην ὁρίσαι ποίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὀρεγόμενος καὶ τίνων ἀπεχόμενος
ἄριστ᾽ ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν διοικοίης. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτας ἐστὶ
πολλὰ  τὰ  παιδεύοντα,  μάλιστα  μὲν  τὸ  μὴ  τρυφᾶν  ἀλλ᾽  ἀναγκάζεσθαι  περὶ  τοῦ
βίου  καθ᾽  ἑκάστην  τὴν  ἡμέραν  βουλεύεσθαι,  ἔπειθ᾽  οἱ  νόμοι  καθ᾽  οὓς  ἕκαστοι
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πολιτευόμενοι  τυγχάνουσιν,  ἔτι  δ᾽  ἡ  παρρησία  καὶ  τὸ φανερῶς  ἐξεῖναι  τοῖς  τε
φίλοις ἐπιπλῆξαι καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐπιθέσθαι ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἁμαρτίαις·  πρὸς  δὲ
τούτοις  καὶ  τῶν  ποιητῶν  τινες  τῶν  προγεγενημένων  ὑποθήκας  ὡς  χρὴ  ζῆν
καταλελοίπασιν· ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς βελτίους γίγνεσθαι. τοῖς δὲ
τυράννοις   οὐδὲν  ὑπάρχει   τοιοῦτον,  ἀλλ᾽  οὓς  ἔδει  παιδεύεσθαι  μᾶλλον  τῶν
ἄλλων, ἐπειδὰν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καταστῶσιν, ἀνουθέτητοι διατελοῦσιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
πλεῖστοι  τῶν  ἀνθρώπων  αὐτοῖς  οὐ  πλησιάζουσιν,  οἱ  δὲ  συνόντες  πρὸς  χάριν
ὁμιλοῦσι.
I could  prescribe  what  pursuits  you  should  aspire  to  and  from what  you
should  abstain  in  order  to  govern  to  the  best  advantage  your  state  and
kingdom. For when men are in private life, many things contribute to their
education: first and foremost, the absence of luxury among them, and the
necessity they are under to take thought each day for their livelihood; next,
the  laws by  which in  each case  their  civic  life  is  governed;  furthermore,
freedom of speech and the privilege which is openly granted to friends
to rebuke and to enemies to attack each other’s faults; besides, a number
of the poets of earlier times have left precepts which direct them how to live;
so  that,  from  all  these  influences,  they  may  reasonably  be  expected  to
become better men. Kings, however, have no such help; on the contrary,
they, who more than other men should be thoroughly trained, live all their
lives, from the time when they are placed in authority, without admonition;
for the great majority of people do not come in contact with them, and those
who  are  of  their  society  consort  with  them  to  gain  their  favor.
(Transl. Norlin)
13 Here  parrhesia is  confined  to  the  private  life  of  individuals,  which  is  obviously
appropriate because Isocrates is addressing the speech to Nicocles, the son of Evagoras,
king of Salamina in Cyprus. In that kind of society, as we said, there is no right to
parrhesia. However, the political value of the notion is clear too, and more so in § 28,
where he counsels the king to grant it to those who may give him good counsel:
[2.28] δίδου παρρησίαν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν, ἵνα περὶ ὧν ἂν ἀμφιγνοῇς, ἔχῃς τοὺς
συνδοκιμάσοντας.
Grant freedom of speech to those who have good judgement, in order that
when you are in doubt you may have friends who will help you to decide.
(Transl. Norlin)
14 As we said, these are the conditions in a non‑democratic state: it is the ruler who grants
this privilege. Since democracy, at least as it is understood in the 5th century, will no
longer  exist  in  ancient  Greece  afterwards  (or  not  much more  than nominally),  the
meaning of this word will undergo very important changes, which constitute a great
lesson in historical politics and historical semantics. We cannot trace them here,9 but
the fuel of the change was no doubt the fact that this word had a potential for a private
alongside a public use (something that for instance a more strictly political notion like
ἰσηγορία did not have), and at the same time it could be used both in a strictly political
and in a social meaning. Once there was no more use for it in real daily‑life politics, it
remained free, so to speak. It  then underwent a change that in the end confined it
almost exclusively to the sphere of private life and the relationship between friends.
It retained of  its  old  political  usages  only  the  capacity  to  designate  a  more  or  less
benevolent  attitude  of  the  ruler  or  superior  towards  his  or  her  subordinates,  an
attitude of tolerance with their frankness or sincerity.10
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15 In the case of Isocrates, the democratic overtones of the word are seen in two other
passages. The first, Archidamos 97:
ὡς  ἔστιν  ἓν  τῶν  αἰσχρῶν  πρότερον  μὲν  μηδὲ  τὰς  τῶν  ἐλευθέρων  ἰσηγορίας
ἀνέχεσθαι, νῦν δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν δούλων παρρησίαν ὑπομένοντας φαίνεσθαι.
For it is disgraceful that we, who in former times would not allow even free
men the right of equal speech, are now openly tolerating licence of speech
on the part of slaves. (Transl. Norlin)
16 Here parrhesia is severely judged, a disgrace—as is to be expected in a Spartan context
and from a Spartan king, in a text that puts emphasis on Spartan harshness. The text
clearly links parrhesia with ἰσηγορία and clearly opposes it to Spartan custom, which is
a way to link it to a democratic kind of society based on ἰσηγορία. At the same time, we
see here how the political and the social aspects of the notion work together, and, more
precisely,  how the  word παρρησία  starts  to  denote  the  social  aspect  of  the  strictly
political notion that is ἰσηγορία.
17 The second is Areopagiticus 20:
οἱ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦντες κατεστήσαντο πολιτείαν οὐκ
ὀνόματι μὲν τῷ κοινοτάτῳ καὶ πραοτάτῳ προσαγορευομένην, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων
οὐ  τοιαύτην  τοῖς  ἐντυγχάνουσι  φαινομένην,  οὐδ᾽  ἣ  τοῦτον  τὸν  τρόπον  ἐπαίδευε
τοὺς πολίτας ὥσθ᾽ ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν μὲν ἀκολασίαν δημοκρατίαν, τὴν δὲ παρανομίαν
ἐλευθερίαν,  τὴν  δὲ  παρρησίαν ἰσονομίαν,  τὴν  δ᾽  ἐξουσίαν  τοῦ  πάντα  ποιεῖν
εὐδαιμονίαν,  ἀλλὰ  μισοῦσα  καὶ  κολάζουσα  τοὺς  τοιούτους  βελτίους  καὶ
σωφρονεστέρους ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ἐποίησεν.
Those who governed the city in those days did not establish a constitution
which  only  in  name  was  the  most  populist  and  the  most  gentle,  while
proving to be quite the opposite to those who experienced it, nor one which
educated  the  citizens  to  regard  license  as  democracy,  lawlessness  as
freedom, free speech as equality under the law, or freedom to do what you
want as happiness but rather by hating and punishing such men, it made all
the citizens better and more moderate. (Transl. Lee Too)
18 The Areopagiticus proposed some restrictions of democratic freedoms, parrhesia among
them,  which  Isocrates  had  soon  to  retract.  I borrow  the  precise  words  of  Robert
Wallace (2004,  229):  “His  next  two  texts,  On Peace and  Antidosis,  retracted  all  of it,
presumably because advocating a restricted democracy had caused him the trouble he
feared. Some people ‘warned me that I even ran the risk, although giving you the very
best advice, of being thought an enemy of the people and of seeking to turn the polis
into an oligarchy’ (7.57, cf. 8.51, 95, 15.285).”
 
4. The problematic aspects of parrhesia
19 Parrhesia may have always  been problematic,  as  is  often surmised (in fact  we don’t
know, as fifth-century texts do not clearly allow such a conclusion), but it was certainly
(becoming?) problematic and even dangerous in the time of Isocrates and later.11 This
problematic aspect is certainly present in his speeches, in the passage that we have just
seen. Also in De bigis 22:
λοιδοροῦσι δὲ λίαν ἀσελγῶς καὶ θρασέως καὶ τὸν ἂλλον βίον τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ
οὐκ αἰσχύνονται τοιαύτῃ παρρησίᾳ χρώμενοι περὶ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος, ἣν ἔδεισαν ἂν
ποιήσασθαι περὶ ζῶντος.
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But  my  father’s  private  life  they  revile  with  excessive  indecency  and
audacity, and they are not ashamed, now that he is dead, to use a license of
speech concerning him which they would have feared to employ while he
lived. (Transl. Norlin)
20 And also in Busiris 38–40:
ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν σοι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐμέλησεν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς τῶν ποιητῶν βλασφημίαις
ἐπηκολούθησας, οἳ δεινότερα μὲν πεποιηκότας καὶ πεπονθότας ἀποφαίνουσι τοὺς ἐκ
τῶν ἀθανάτων γεγονότας ἢ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἀνοσιωτάτων, τοιούτους
δὲ  λόγους  περὶ  αὐτῶν  τῶν  θεῶν  εἰρήκασιν,  οἵους  οὐδεὶς  ἂν  περὶ  τῶν  ἐχθρῶν
εἰπεῖν τολμήσειεν.
[…]
Ὥστ’, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ μιμησόμεθα τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων, οὐδὲ περὶ μὲν
τῆς  πρὸς  ἀλλήλους  κακηγορίας  νομοθετήσομεν,  τῆς  δ᾽  εἰς  τοὺς  θεοὺς  παρρησίας
ὀλιγωρήσομεν, ἀλλὰ φυλαξόμεθα καὶ νομιοῦμεν ὁμοίως ἀσεβεῖν τούς τε λέγοντας
τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτοῖς.
But the fact is that you had no regard for the truth; on the contrary, you
followed the calumnies of the poets, who declare that the offspring of the
immortals have perpetrated as well as suffered things more atrocious than
any perpetrated or suffered by the offspring of the most impious of mortals;
aye, the poets have related about the gods themselves tales more outrageous
than anyone would dare tell concerning their enemies.
[…]
Therefore if  we are wise we shall  not imitate their [the poets’]  tales,  nor
while passing laws for the punishment of libels against each other, shall we
disregard loose-tongued vilification of the gods; on the contrary, we shall be
on our guard and consider equally guilty of impiety those who recite and
those who believe such lies. (Transl. Van Hook)
21 Indeed we have evidence that at least in late antiquity these two speeches were singled
out  for  this  use  of  the  word  parrhesia that  comes  close  to  slander,  as  results  from
Harpocration p. 239, lines 1–2 Dindorf: Παρρησίας· ἀντὶ τοῦ βλασφημίας καὶ λοιδορίας
Ἰσοκράτης Βουσίριδι [καὶ περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους].12
 
5. The comic poets’ parrhesia in Isocrates
22 It is time now to discuss De pace 14, the passage in which apparently the language of
comedy is designated by  the  word parrhesia.  We have  seen so  far  that  in  Isocrates 
parrhesia means generally saying something openly, either in public or in private, that
its political value is often apparent, and we saw also its social value emerging at several
points. Its firm democratic value is also apparent, both by itself and by contrast with its
negative evaluation in non‑democratic contexts (Sparta, Salamina in Cyprus). All these
utilizations  are  in  agreement  with the  general,  most  common uses  in  fifth-century
Athens. On the other hand, we have just seen also that in a couple of passages it refers
to  insulting  language,  is  negatively  valued  and  is  explicitly  opposed  to  the  truth;
apparently  in  the same vein,  De pace 14  seems to  liken parrhesia to  the language of
comedy. Let’s quote it at length (13–14):
ὅταν  μὲν  ὑπὲρ  τῶν  ἰδίων  βουλεύησθε,  ζητεῖτε  συμβούλους  τοὺς ἄμεινον
φρονοῦντας  ὑμῶν  αὐτῶν,  ὅταν  δ᾽  ὑπὲρ  τῆς  πόλεως  ἐκκλησιάζητε,  τοῖς  μὲν
τοιούτοις  ἀπιστεῖτε  καὶ  φθονεῖτε,  τοὺς  δὲ  πονηροτάτους  τῶν  ἐπὶ  τὸ  βῆμα
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παριόντων  ἀσκεῖτε,  καὶ  νομίζετε  δημοτικωτέρους  εἶναι  τοὺς  μεθύοντας  τῶν
νηφόντων καὶ τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας τῶν εὖ φρονούντων καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως
διανεμομένους  τῶν  ἐκ  τῆς  ἰδίας  οὐσίας  ὑμῖν  λειτουργούντων.  ὥστ᾽  ἄξιον
θαυμάζειν, εἴ τις ἐλπίζει τὴν πόλιν τοιούτοις συμβούλοις χρωμένην ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον
ἐπιδώσειν. [14] ἐγὼ δ᾽οἶδα μὲν ὅτι πρόσαντές ἐστιν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ταῖς ὑμετέραις
διανοίαις,  καὶ  ὅτι  δημοκρατίας  οὔσης  οὐκ  ἔστι  παρρησία,  πλὴν  ἐνθάδε  μὲν  τοῖς
ἀφρονεστάτοις  καὶ  μηδὲν  ὑμῶν  φροντίζουσιν,  ἐν  δὲ  τῷ  θεάτρω  τοῖς
κωμῳδοδιδασκάλοις.
Whenever you deliberate about your private affairs, you look for advisors
who are wiser than you are, but when you hold an assembly to talk about the
city’s  affairs,  you  distrust  and  are  jealous  of  those  people  and  cultivate
instead  the  worst  of  those  who  rise  to  speak.  You  think  there  is  more
goodwill toward the people among those who are drunk than among those
who are sober, among the foolish more than among the wise, and among
those who distribute the city’s property more than among those who benefit
the city at their own expense. It is amazing that anyone expects the city to
prosper using advisors like that. [14] I know that it is dangerous to oppose
your views and that even though we live in a democracy, there is still no
freedom of speech, except here in the Assembly for those who are foolish
and  do  not  care  about  you,  or  in  the  theater  for  the  comic  poets.
(Transl. Papillon)
23 However,  most of  the occurrences of  the word in Isocrates refer to his  own use of 
parrhesia. In four passages, it characterizes generally a good part of his own production
(Antidosis 10), and his typical way of speaking (Antidosis 179, Philip 72, Archidamus 12); in
two more, it characterizes globally one individual speech (Antidosis 43, where parrhesia 
and truth come together, as is often the case, and Panathenaicus 96).
24 Now, if Isocrates is fond of using parrhesia to characterize his own free speech, is it
plausible that he can employ this word to designate the free speech of the comic poets
and the slander of those who revile his father? No, it isn’t. What can then be the end of
the application of the word parrhesia to these kinds of insulting language? One response
is offered by some passages in which a distinction between two kinds of parrhesia is
suggested.13 One is in the Panathenaicus 218:
ταῦτα  δ᾽  αὐτοῦ  διαλεχθέντος  ἀπεδεξάμην  μέν,  οὐχ  ὡς  διαλυόμενόν  τι  τῶν
κατηγορημένων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀποκρυπτόμενον τὸ πικρότατον τῶν τότε ῥηθέντων οὐκ
ἀπαιδεύτως  ἀλλὰ  νοῦν  ἐχόντως,  καὶ  περὶ  τῶν  ἄλλων  ἀπολελογημένον
σωφρονέστερον ἢ τότε παρρησιασάμενον.
When  he  said  this,  I accepted  it  not  because  he  had  refuted  any  of  my
criticisms, but because he had covered over the most bitter part of what he
had said, not crudely, but quite thoughtfully, and had defended himself on
the other  points,  more  prudently  than  when  he  spoke  frankly  before. 
(Transl. Papillon)
25 The other two are in the Letter to Antipater. In § 4, Diodotus “is extremely frank not in
an inappropriate way but in a way that most reasonably gives evidence of his goodwill
toward  his  friends”  (πλείστην  ἔχειν  παρρησίαν,  οὐχ  ἣν  οὐ  προσῆκεν,  ἀλλὰ  τὴν
εἰκότως  ἂν  μέγιστον  γιγνομένην  σημεῖον  τῆς  εὐνοίας  τῆς  πρὸς  τοὺς  φίλους,  transl.
Papillon). In § 6, “those who speak openly in the interest of what is best” (τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ
βελτίστῳ  παρρησιαζομένους)  are  the  reason  that  monarchies  and  constitutional
governments alike are preserved; in the next sentence, these are identified with the
people who tell the truth.14
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26 We have then in the first passage an inappropriate and an appropriate way to practice 
parrhesia.  The appropriate  way shows goodwill  towards one’s  friends,  meaning that
those who practice it want the best for their friends and try to be useful. And in the
second passage, the useful parrhesia which makes governments of all kinds endure is
equal to the truth.15 The two kinds of parrhesia have nothing to do with comic poetry.
However,  the  distinction  in  the Panathenaicus is  between  a  more  judicious
(σωφρονέστερον) and a parrhesiastic way of speaking, described as ‘bitter’ (πικρός). In
the Busiris, those who are wise (ἢν σωφρονῶμεν) do not employ that parrhesia against
the gods. In the De pace passage, the orators who enjoy parrhesia are ἀφρονεστάτοι, an
antonym of σωφρονέστεροι,  and do not care about the Athenians. As a consequence,
what this passage means is that things are so wrong that there is no parrhesia except for
those who do not know how to practice it and have no goodwill towards the Athenians,
and for comedy. The form it takes is a sort of impossibilium, an ἀδύνατον asserting that
things have reached the most extreme depravity. Something like: things are so bad that
now the Athenians only pay attention to the most depraved of the orators, consider
friends of the people those who are drunk rather than those who are sober, those who
are witless rather than those who are wise, and those who dole out the public money
rather than those who perform public services at their own expense; and what is now
considered to be parrhesia is the speech of those who do not care about the Athenians
and that of the comic poets. In the same move, he equates the “most foolish” orators
with comedy, a simple way to denigrate them, not dissimilar to what Plato does in the 
Apology in likening the accusations against Socrates also to comedy.16
 
6. Conclusion
27 The function and import of comedy’s free speech is hotly debated, but we do not need
to enter this debate at the moment. What matters in the present context is that even
though comedy is expected to represent and say things unacceptable in other contexts,
something that Aristotle presents as a matter of law and custom (νόμος),17 this is not
the same thing that the Athenians of the time dub parrhesia. This is not surprising. We
cannot attempt now to explain why at length, but the main reason is clear, in my view.
I have hinted at it at the outset. Parrhesia is not simply speaking shamelessly, nor even
license to say whatever one pleases.18 One of the main components of the notion of 
parrhesia,  as  several  studies  on  this  concept  have  made  clear,  is  truth—or  better
sincerity or candor, because what is said must not necessarily be true, but must be said
in earnest thinking that it is the truth.19 Comedy does not meet this condition, it is full
of  ideas  and  statements  that  nobody,  apart  from  maybe  the  comic  character,  can
believe, like for instance that human beings will be better off if Zeus is overthrown.
Thus, it does not qualify for parrhesia. In my view, this is another example of the clear
difference drawn in the classical period between the use of language in daily life and in
comedy.20 Indeed I doubt very much that comedy in classical Athens may be said to
practice free speech: comedians were not exactly free to choose what kind of language
they used and what kind of things they presented on stage. To some extent they were,
of course, but (to give an extreme and indeed impossible example) had a comedian
presented a comedy composed wholly with the kind of language, characters and plots
that go with tragedy, he would have surely failed—in fact he most probably would not
have been allowed to even present it on stage. Parrhesia (and in general free speech)
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does not pertain to comedy, it pertains to daily life (politics, social relations). In the
classical period probably nobody could have confused the two. This is why there is no
source that connects them except that single passage in Isocrates, where it is precisely
this common knowledge what allows Isocrates to use this notion to describe a depraved
situation in which parrhesia is likened to what the comic poets do.
28 One last consequence of this conclusion: avoiding the word parrhesia to name the comic
use of language is not just a matter of applying the right name in Greek terms. The
main problem with this confusion is rather that by identifying the coarse language that
is proper to comedy with the political right of parrhesia and/or the social attitude of the
good (or at least candid) counsellor or friend, we are giving comedy a role that it did
not  have,  while  at  the  same time distorting the  notion of parrhesia,  a  very  serious
notion that has no role in comedy except that of being subverted (in Thesm. 541, the
only occurrence of  the word in extant  old comedy,  as  we saw above)  for  the good
reason that it is indeed a very important notion.
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NOTES
1. I wish to thank the two anonymous readers for some valuable comments and suggestions on
an  earlier  draft.  Also  the  colleagues  in  the  research  project  PID2019-110908GB-I00,  and
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particularly Felix Jacome for a helpful discussion. And certainly Alberto Cecon, for his care and
patience.
2. Some examples: the classical and indispensable study on parrhesia by Giuseppe Scarpat (2001)
takes it for granted, even in the absence of evidence: “Il termine parrhesia ha quindi nel suo nascere
valore politico e sfumatura polemica e, pur essendo documentato una volta sola in Aristofane, è l’insegna
della commedia attica.” Momigliano (1973, 258) is less clear in this respect, but he also mingles the
various kinds of freedom of speech in the assembly,  in the theatre and in ordinary life.  The
sensible and nuanced Halliwell, “Comic satire and freedom of speech” (Halliwell, 1991, 65–66)
likens  comic  satire  to  parrhesia.  This  case  is  interesting  in  that,  on  the  one  hand,  this
identification is not necessary, nor brought about by his source (Ath. Pol.), which does not use the
word; on the other hand, it does not impinge on the value of the paper or its conclusions, which
remain one of the best treatments of the subject. On the side of the political studies, Ober (1998),
does not use parrhesia in referring to comedy, but does understand all the same that comedy’s
freedom of speech is the same kind of political freedom of speech allowed to the citizens; see e.g.
p. 125: “His [Aristophanes’] audience and judges (the demos and its lotteried representatives)
expected him to exercise an extreme form of the citizen’s privilege of free speech, to search out
and to expose to public view things that were ordinarily hidden or tacitly ignored by the rest of
the  citizenry.  The fact  that  Aristophanes  had  a long  and  successful  career  suggests  that he
fulfilled  those  expectations.”  Rosen (2013)  has  it  already  in  the  title  and  suffers  from  this
confusion all along. To what extent this confusion and the connection with comedy has taken
root that Kierstead (2018),  on no grounds whatsoever, asserts that parrhesia “appears to have
emerged from the less restrained contexts of village festivals and cultic celebrations.  It is  an
integral  part  of  a  long  literary  tradition  of  invective,  normally  iambic  in  meter  and  anti-
tyrannical  in  spirit.”  Such  a  connection  between  parrhesia and  cultic  celebrations  or  village
festivals is never found in Greek sources and there are no grounds for such a hypothesis on the
origin of the word or the concept.
3. Sluiter & Rosen (2004, 7).
4. It is  not  about  comedy,  but  Theophrastus,  Characters 28.6  suggests  that  calling  slander
‘parrhesia’ is a misnomer. His slanderous man speaks ill about everybody, including the dead,
“misnaming his slander parrhesia,  democracy and freedom” (καὶ  πλεῖστα  περὶ  τῶν  φίλων  καὶ
οἰκείων  κακὰ  εἰπεῖν  καὶ  περὶ  τῶν  τετελευτηκότων  κακῶς  λέγειν,  ἀποκαλῶν  παρρησίαν  καὶ
δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἐλευθερίαν).
5. For  a  discussion  of  the  ancient  and  modern  notion  of  ‘rights’,  referring  in  particular  to
parrhesia, see Carter (2004). Even though he starts from the statement “To imply that free speech
was considered a right by the Athenians is, I would suggest, a misconception”, what he means is
that their conception of what is a right was different from ours: “Under modern democracies,
freedoms are conceived of as negative rights, and these include a right to Freedom of Speech. The
Athenians, on the other hand, while they conceived of political freedom in terms very close to a
negative right, thought of free speech as something very different: a characteristic of citizens, an
attribute, which was a sort of side effect of their political enfranchisement.” (Carter, 2004, 198)
Also  Konstan (2012)  is  reluctant  to  call  parrhesia a  right  in  the  modern sense.  This  is  surely
correct, but we can still call it a right in the ancient sense, because it would certainly not be
correct  to  suggest  that  there  were  no  rights  in  the  ancient  world.  Indeed,  the  5th  century
occurrences of the word parrhesia make it clear that this notion serves to draw a dividing line
between what a citizen can do and a non‑citizen cannot do.
6. It has been proposed to interpret parrhesia in these passages not as a citizen’s right, but as an
elite privilege (see Carter, 2004; Konstan, 2012). It is true, as Konstan has it, that in all three cases
they are upper‑class individuals, but in all cases too it is a matter of being or not being a free
citizen,  this  is  clearly  spelled  out,  particularly  in  Hippolytus and  Ion: parrhesia is  directly
dependent on citizenship, not on pertaining or not to the ruling class. In the case of Polyneices
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it is  simply  not  stated,  but  it  does  not  seem  probable  to  me,  if  parrhesia depends  on  social
standing rather than citizenship, that, being a member of the upper class, he would not have the
freedom to speak his mind in Argos. Relations of xenia among the aristocratic houses were strong
enough to grant Polyneices a special position, not just that of a commoner. He would not be a
citizen, though, whereas in Thebes he was: that is the difference.
7. I take the very exact translation “intrinsic to freedom” from Konstan (2012, 2).
8. The contrast between a democratic and a tyrannical situation in terms of free speech may be
expressed with other words as well, and certainly antedates the first occurrences of the word
parrhesia. In Aeschylus’ Persians, for instance, the word parrhesia does not occur, but the language
is strongly reminiscent of this notion: once the Asian lands are released from Persian rule “for
the royal power has perished utterly” (v. 590), οὐδ᾽ ἔτι γλῶσσα βροτοῖσιν | ἐν φυλακαῖς· λέλυται
γὰρ | λαὸς ἐλεύθερα βάζειν, | ὡς ἐλύθη ζυγὸν ἀλκᾶς (“No longer will men keep a curb upon their
tongues; for the people are set free to utter their thoughts at will, now that the yoke of power has
been broken”, 591–94, transl. Smyth).
9. Some  important  treatments  of  the  history  of  this  notion  are  Momigliano (1973),
Foucault (1983), Scarpat (2001).
10. This change is succinctly described in very exact words by Konstan (2016, 422), relying on
Momigliano (1973): “The royal courts were hierarchical, and the freedom to speak about matters
of  policy  was  by  no  means  guaranteed.  The  king  might  consult  a council  of  his  friends  or
advisors, but their liberty to express their views was a privilege, not a right, and there was always
the risk that too much frankness might offend the ruler. In this context, candor required courage
and flattery was often the safer, if not the nobler, course. In the words of Momigliano (p. 260),
after  the  Athenian  democracy  yielded  to  autocracy,  ‘parrhesia as  a  private  virtue  replaced
parrhesia as a political right.’” This evolution is also one of the conclusions of Scarpat (2001).
11. Such dangerous aspects emerge with some frequency in the orators. E.g. Aeschines, Against
Timarchus 172: “Nikodemos of Aphidna was killed violently by Aristarchos, poor man, who had
both his eyes gouged out and his tongue cut out, the tongue with which he had addressed you
freely (ἐπαρρησιάζετο), trusting in your laws and in you.” (Transl. Fisher) This speech is also a
good example of several other aspects of parrhesia: its connection with democracy, its relation to
trust (i.e. trust on both sides: the recipient of parrhesia needs to trust the parrhesiastes, and the
parrhesiastes needs to trust  the addressee)  and the fact  that  parrhesia was a  debated issue in
Aeschines’ day (see also Aeschin. 1.6, 173).
12. “Meaning calumnies, and abuse. Isocrates in Busiris [and On the Team of Horses]”. Abridged in
the Suda pi 637.
13. The  distinction  is  also  found in  other  texts,  as  e.g.  Euripides,  Orestes, 902–905  (κἀμαθεῖ
παρρησίᾳ), which does not mean that parrhesia is amathes, but that it can be practised in a way
that is amathes.  Cf. also Sluiter & Rosen (2004, 4): “parrhêsia may in and of itself be used as a
simple  descriptor,  e.g.  of  a  practice  commonly  associated  with  democracy,  which  may  be
evaluated as either a good or a bad thing depending on the views of the speaker.”
14. Ὧν  ἕνεκα  προσῆκε  μὲν  παρὰ  πᾶσι  τοῖς  μονάρχοις  πλέον  φέρεσθαι  τοὺς  τὴν  ἀλήθειαν
ἀποφαινομένους  τῶν  ἅπαντα  μὲν  πρὸς  χάριν,  μηδὲν  δὲ  χάριτος  ἄξιον  λεγόντων  (“For  these
reasons it is indeed fitting that in the courts of all monarchs those who declare the truth should
be held in greater esteem than those who, though they aim to gratify in all they say, yet say
naught that merits gratitude”, transl. Van Hook).
15. Also in De bigis 22 an allusion to two kinds of parrhesia may be discerned: τοιαύτῃ παρρησίᾳ
implies that there is another kind, the good one in this case (see Jufresa, 2017, 9).
16. See Riu (2013, 193–96).
17. Aristotle, Politics 13336b3–23. Cf. Riu (2012, 257–263); Boedeker (2016, 71, n. 72).
18. Cf. supra, n. 4, on Theophr. Characters.
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19. This is an essential part of the concept which will not disappear in the aftermath. See for
instance how David Konstan succinctly and very clearly explains why Plutarch, in his treatise on
how to tell a flatterer from a friend deals with parrhesia: “[…] the reason is that frankness is the
primary indicator of the openness and honesty characteristic of the friend as opposed to the
dissimulation that marks the toady.” (Konstan, 1996, 7) A good 4th-century example of the fact
that  candor  and  truth  are  an  essential  part  of  parrhesia is  Aristotle,  Eth. Nic.  1124b29–31:
ἀναγκαῖον  δὲ  καὶ  φανερομισῆ  εἶναι  καὶ  φανερόφιλον  (τὸ  γὰρ  λανθάνειν  φοβουμένου,  καὶ
ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς (παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ
διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι’ εἰρωνείαν [εἰρωνεία δὲ] πρὸς
τοῦς πολλοῦς) [“He [the megalopsukhos] necessarily hates and loves openly, for concealing these
things is the mark of a fearful person, as is neglecting the truth rather than people’s opinion; and
he speaks and acts openly (for he is candid because he is contemptuous, and he is truthful except
when he is being ironic (yes, ironic) towards the many”)]. See the commentary on the text and
interpretation  in  the  Appendix  to  J. J.  Mulhern (2004,  335–37),  who  highlights  the  contrast
between parrhesia and irony. Aristotle indeed makes it clear that truth goes with parrhesia but not
with eironeia, which is only expectable, because eironeia consists in somehow saying the opposite
of what one believes to be the truth.
20. Cf. Riu (2012).
ABSTRACTS
The expression comic parrhesia is common in the scholarly literature, and the notion that the
word  παρρησία  in  ancient  Greek  may  denote  comedy’s  freedom  of  speech  is  almost
commonplace, and taken for granted. This is the case across scholarship about freedom of speech
or frankness, about comedy, and generally about invective. However, the word parrhesia rarely
appears  in  the  classical  era  in  relation  to  comedy  or  even  poetry.  In all  the  extant  Greek
literature of the classical period, only one passage connects παρρησία  with comedy: Isocrates, 
On the  Peace 14.  This  simple  fact  should  render  such  a  connection  suspect,  and  it  justifies  a
re‑examination of the evidence.
L’expression parrhèsia comique est courante dans la bibliographie, et l’idée que le mot παρρησία en
grec  ancien  puisse  dénoter  la  licence  propre  à  la  comédie  est  presque  un  lieu  commun,
présupposée et considérée sans hésitation comme allant de soi. Il en est ainsi dans les études
aussi  bien  à propos  de  la  liberté  de  parole  ou  la  franchise  qu’à propos  de  la  comédie  ou
globalement  de  l’invective.  Pourtant,  le  mot  parrhèsia ne  se  trouve  presque  pas  à  l’époque
classique en rapport avec la comédie ou même avec la poésie.  Dans toute la littérature de la
période classique, il n’y a qu’un seul passage qui connecte la παρρησία avec la comédie : Isocrate,
Sur la paix, 14. Ce seul fait rend la connexion suspecte et justifie un réexamen des données.
INDEX
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